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Abstract
This manuscript examines the member-agricultural cooperative relationship from the point of view of the agency
and the property rights theories. The sample analysed includes 277 personal surveys completed by members of
agricultural cooperatives in the Region of Murcia (Spain). Results show that in all questions related to objectives
and level of satisfaction, members value them with an average of 6.9 out of 10 or higher in all cases. For both objectives
and satisfaction, the directors and the cooperative members who depend upon agricultural activity for a large
percentage of their income have higher scores, compared with non-board members and members who are less
dependent on agricultural activity (with a statistical signif icance of 1% and 5%, respectively). We also f ind that
members who agree in more with the admission of new members, who think it is easy to recover their investments
and who want to stay longer in the cooperative are those who are more willing to invest and to exert control.
Furthermore, we find that members that prefer to have a participation in the assembly proportional to their contribution
and that prefer that the cooperative diversifies more are those who are more willing to invest. In addition, control is
favoured by members pertaining to the cooperative for a large period and for those members who think that investing
in the cooperative is a high risk and who prefer long-term investments. Finally, directors are more willing to invest
and to exert control.
Additional key words: control; investment; members’ objectives and satisfaction.
Resumen
Las teorías de agencia y de los derechos de propiedad en las cooperativas agrícolas: evidencia para España
Este trabajo examina la relación socio-cooperativa agraria desde el punto de vista de las teorías de la agencia y
los derechos de propiedad. La muestra analizada incluye 277 encuestas personales realizadas a los socios de las co-
operativas agrarias de la Región de Murcia (España). Los resultados muestran que los niveles de valoración de los
objetivos que se pueden alcanzar en la cooperativa y de satisfacción de los socios superan 6,9 sobre 10 en todas las
cuestiones planteadas. Tanto para los objetivos como para el nivel de satisfacción, los miembros del consejo rector
y los socios cuyo porcentaje de ingresos dependen en mayor medida de la actividad agraria presentan mayores va-
lores (con una significación del 1 y 5% respectivamente). También encontramos los socios que están de acuerdo con
la entrada de nuevos cooperativistas, que piensan que resulta fácil recuperar las aportaciones y que tienen intención
de permanecer más tiempo en la cooperativa están más incentivados a la hora de invertir y de ejercer el control. Adi-
cionalmente, se observa que aquellos que desean una participación proporcional a la aportación, y que desean di-
versificar más son los que están más dispuestos a realizar inversiones. Por otro lado, el control se ve favorecido por
aquellos miembros más antiguos, o que piensan que invertir en la cooperativa supone un elevado riesgo o que pre-
fieren inversiones a largo plazo. Finalmente, los consejeros se encuentran más incentivados a invertir y a realizar el
control.
Palabras clave adicionales: control; inversión; objetivos y satisfacción de los miembros.
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Introduction
One characteristic of agricultural cooperatives is the
peculiar relationship of the organisation with its mem-
bers, because these are simultaneously the owners,
users (buyers and sellers), controllers, and beneficia-
ries (Nilsson, 1996). Such complexity makes it
possible to study this relationship from different points
of view: Neoclassical Theory, Agency Theory, Tran-
saction Costs Theory, Property Rights Theory, Resour-
ces and Capabilities Theory and Relational Theory1.
Agency Theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and
Property Rights Theory (Fulton, 1995) both point out
governance problems on these firms in concrete terms.
In cooperatives, agency problems may arise because
of clashes over objectives between members and the
manager, between members and directors, and between
the manager and directors. On the other hand, a lack
of dynamism in the labour market for cooperative ma-
nagers and the difficulty of replacing managers give
considerable power to managers (Nilsson, 2001). In
the cooperative property rights are not properly de-
fined, producing low incentives to exercise control,
driving to low investment (Vitaliano, 1983).
There are two main reasons why little attention has
been devoted to cooperatives in the corporate governance
literature. On the one hand, most research assumes that
in the cooperatives there is no separation between
ownership and control and, therefore, conflict does not
exist (Hansmann, 1988). On the other hand, the research
on corporate governance usually focuses on large
firms, mainly quoted firms, where the agency problems
are much more evident.
Considering that the manager’s utility function
depends on their power, their prestige, the probability
of retaining their employment and their remuneration
(Williamson, 1964), this study pursues two main ob-
jectives: a) to analyze whether some characteristics of
the governance of cooperatives may reduce conflicts
(measured by the possibility of discrepancy in objec-
tives and level of satisfaction), and b) to study whether
property rights variables may influence the investors’
efforts and their control capacity. There is some pre-
vious evidence analyzing Spanish agricultural coope-
ratives. From our point of view, the more related one
is López et al. (2005), examining the level of satisfac-
tion of cooperative members for the wine sector in
Alicante. The main contribution of this paper is, on the
one hand, the fact of analyzing not only objectives and
satisfaction, but also investors’ efforts and control
capacity, and, on the other hand, dealing with a different
sector and geographical area than the scarce previous
evidence.
Theoretical framework
The International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) de-
fines a co-operative as «an autonomous association of
persons united voluntarily to meet their common eco-
nomic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through
a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enter-
prise» (ICA, 2007). The seven internationally recogni-
zed cooperative principles are: voluntary and open
membership; democratic member control; member
economic participation; autonomy and independence;
provision of education, training and information; coo-
peration among cooperatives; and concern for the
community. However, not all the countries adopted all
these principles. For example, in 1987 the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) adopted just
the three principles of user ownership, user control and
user benefit (the first three ICA principles) (Ortmann
and King, 2007). As pointed by Barton (1989), essen-
tially, a cooperative is a user-owned and user-controlled
business that distributes benefits equitably on the basis
of use or patronage. Thus, a farmer member who accounts
for 5% of the volume of agricultural products delivered
to the cooperative would receive 5% of the net earnings
derived from the handling, processing and marketing
of those products.
Spanish Cooperative Law (BOE, 1999), points out
in Article 1.1 that, «A cooperative is a firm constituted
by people that freely associate and voluntarily retire,
in order to undertake managerial activities». Following
this definition and other precepts of the law it is dedu-
ced that both its capital and the number of members
(principals) may vary over the life of the organisation.
The maintenance of individual property holdings of
the partners joint to a coordinated management of the
cooperative through administrative controls, make the
cooperative having both market-associated characteris-
tics and company-associated characteristics. For this
reason the cooperative has been considered as a hybrid
form of government transactions (Coque, 2008; Salazar
and Galve, 2010).
1 For a comparison of diverse theoretical perspectives on organizational governance of cooperatives, please see (Cornforth, 2004).
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In the organization of cooperatives, one source of
authority is the General Assembly, which is the meeting
of members, constituted in order to consider and to adopt
agreements on those matters that, legal or statutorily,
are their competence, and decisions of the Assembly
are binding on all members. The General Assembly is
the equivalent to the Shareholders’ Meeting in Inc.
corporations, except that shareholders differ in terms
of their contribution to the firm’s capital, while coo-
perative members differ in terms of the cooperative ac-
tivity undertaken by the member.
The other source of authority within the cooperative
is the board of directors. It corresponds to the board
the top administration, the supervision of the managers
and the representation of the cooperative. Dow and
Putterman (2000) point out that the only difference
between these two organizational types is that coopera-
tive directors are chosen by the members, while, in
capital based f irms, the members of the board of
directors are chosen by the shareholders.
One of the principles on which cooperatives are
based is that of democratic governance. This feature
is generally seen as the most important of all its identi-
fying marks. This principle implies that each member
has one vote in the general assembly. From the point
of view of democratic governance, cooperative mana-
gement rests on several premises (Chaves, 2004): 
1) the members decide democratically and manage at
the general assembly, 2) the members actively partici-
pate in the general assembly as well as in the election
of representatives; 3) representative posts, blending
into the board of directors, represent and manage, and
4) the representative posts are accountable to the mem-
bership. An additional premise can be added: 5) coope-
ratives, especially large ones, can be fitted with mana-
gers and other salaried staff managers, in order to im-
plement the decisions of members and achieve good
economic performance (Chaves, 2004).
Agency theory
Agency theory is an appropriate framework to exa-
mine the relationships in any firm and, therefore, in
agricultural cooperatives. The concept on which this
theory is based is the «agency relationship». This rela-
tionship is defined «as a contract under which one or
more persons (the principal/s) engage another person
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf
which involves delegating some decision making
authority to the agent» (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
If both parts of the relationship are utility maximizers,
act rationally and form unbiased expectations of the
impact of the agency relationships in their utility func-
tion, then agents will try to reach their objectives, which
may or may not coincide with those of the principal
(Barnea et al., 1985).
This issue will provoke agency conflicts. However,
agency problems will arise when, in addition to conflict
of objectives between the principal and the agent, there
is information asymmetry between them. If a conflict
of objectives takes place, but the principal has perfect
information on the agent’s performances, the loss of
efficiency can be overcome by the principal including
in the contract the performances that the agent should
carry out, as well as checking if the agent has followed
instructions, with the possibility of including penalties
in case of breach of contract.
The agency costs are the sum of (Jensen and Meckling,
1976): 1) Monitoring expenditures: the principal will
limit the autonomy of the agent by installing controls,
maintaining registrations, establishing budgetary
limits, making direct supervision, using payment sys-
tems to condition the agent’s incentives, etc. 2) Bon-
ding costs: agents can voluntarily accept clauses in
their contracts restricting their discretion; these restric-
tions may cause additional costs, for example costs
associated with prof itable investments that may be
rejected, direct cost associated with the formalization
of the contract, and so on. 3) Residual loss.
As previously mentioned, the assumption of an
absence of separation between ownership and control,
and the fact that most previous research has focused
on large quoted firms, means that little attention has
been devoted to cooperatives in the corporate gover-
nance literature. However, it cannot be assumed that
there is no separation of ownership and control in a
cooperative, especially when the number of members
of the cooperative increases (Morales, 2004). Thus, it
would appear to be a mistake to overlook the separation
of ownership and control in cooperatives.
In large quoted firms, it is usually assumed that sha-
reholders have a common objective, maximizing the
firm’s market value, which conflicts with maximizing
the managers’ utility function. However, as pointed out
by Hansmann (1996), given that members in the coope-
rative may play different roles simultaneously (owners,
buyers and sellers, controllers, and beneficiaries) they
may also have very diverse objectives. Avoiding the
costs derived from decision taking in a collective way
Agency and property rights theories in agricultural cooperatives: evidence from Spain 911
may be the main reason why members usually delegate
day-to-day decisions to managers.
Therefore, cooperatives face two problems. On the
one hand, in most cooperatives the administration is
delegated to managers or professional agents. On the
other hand, the multiplicity of objectives that member
may have means the objectives of the organisation are
not well defined, and managers’ discretion increases,
making it more probable that they adopt decisions that
benefit themselves to the detriment of members. In
addition, as pointed out by Tirole (2001) and Orellana
(2002), the multiplicity of objectives makes it much
more difficult to establish incentives and control me-
chanisms that minimize conflicts between members
and managers.
As previously mentioned, cooperatives can be fitted
with managers and other salaried staff managers. In
this case, cooperative would be classified pertaining to
a dualist structure. As highlighted by Rodríguez and
Mozas (2003) and Mozas (2004), the various laws per-
taining to cooperatives in Spain allow them not only ha-
ving a dualist structure, but also a monist structure,
characterized this last one by a lack of professional
managers. In both structures it is the members, in
general assemblies, who decide on the strategies to be
adopted. Further, to the general assemblies, the elected
board is charged with carrying out these decisions.
However, in the monist structure there are no professio-
nal managers to advise the elected board and the mem-
bers’ assembly on the advantages or disadvantages of
a particular strategic decision. It is therefore up to the
members and the elected board to manage the coope-
rative themselves.
Following Fama and Jensen (1983), the decision pro-
cess has four steps: 1) initiation, which is the genera-
tion of proposals for resource utilization and structu-
ring of contracts; 2) ratification, that it is the choice
of decision initiatives to be implemented; 3) implemen-
tation or execution of ratified decisions; and 4) moni-
toring or measuring the performance of decisions
agents and implementation rewards.
The first and third steps are considered as decision
management, whether the second and forth are consi-
dered as control steps. The formal control of the
decisions in the case of the cooperative enterprise
always lies with the partners and is vested in general
assembly under the principle of democracy (one man
one vote). The first and third stages are responsibility
of the board. However, if the cooperative opts for a
dual structure, management can be delegated to mana-
gement, appearing an agency relationship (Salazar and
Galve, 2010).
There are two main reasons why professional mana-
gers have increased their power in recent times (Chaves
and Sajardo, 2004a,b). On the one hand there are
technical and economic reasons, and on the other hand
there are organisational reasons. The technical and eco-
nomic reasons are due to the nature of the business ac-
tivity, which makes increases demand of professional
administrator with skill and competences to run a
business. The organisational reason for this phenome-
non is the growing dispersion of shareholders and the
fragmentation of holdings among small shareholders.
Particular characteristics of social economy managers
depend on two main aspects: their economic interests
and their managerial culture. Focusing on their mana-
gerial culture, Davis (2004) considers two main mana-
ging types: the business school managers and the social
economy managers2. As pointed by Chaves and Sajardo
(2004a,b), compared to business school managers: «so-
cial economy managers are characterised by being sharers
and carriers of the culture of the social economy sector.
They are aware of (and share) the cultural baggage of
the social economy as well as its specific operational
methods and social project of the social economy com-
pany in which they work. Their value system and ethics
are akin to those of the social economy and conflict
with those of the business school manager»3.
Corporate governance control mechanisms are de-
signed to align the interests of owners and managers
of f irms. Problems associated to the governance of
cooperatives have been tackled with less intensity and
a certain delay relative to capitalist firms. Most studies
on this subject agree that problems on cooperatives are
more complicated due to the fact that there are more
players relative to capitalist firms and, in addition, some
of them assume more of a role. In fact, although some
studies suggest that in the cooperatives there is no se-
paration between ownership and control and, therefore,
conflict does not exist (Hansmann, 1988), other studies
such as Spear (2004a,b) put the emphasis in the limi-
tations of the cooperative members to influence the
2 Other authors make other classifications for managing types. For example, Bataille-Chedotel and Huntzinger (2004a,b) consider
three profiles: mountain-climbers, helicopters and parachutists.
3 For recent surveys on the management of cooperatives, as well as for a proposal of evaluation of cooperatives, please see López
et al. (2004, 2006).
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behaviour of managers, to the point of concluding that
in such companies the discretionallity of the managers
is larger than in capitalist firms4.
Literature usually classifies control mechanisms for
Inc. corporations as either internal or external to the
firm. Internal control mechanisms, which include the
ownership structure of the firm, boards of directors,
and compensation systems, are particularly important
when markets, and hence external control mechanisms,
are less well developed. An example is Spain as compa-
red to the anglo-saxon countries. Focusing on coopera-
tives, the market for corporate control, which is the main
external control mechanism, does not work due to the
non-possibility of transmission of residual rights. Thus,
in cooperatives, the only control mechanisms working
are the internal to the firm. For this reason, this classi-
fication is not usually employed in cooperatives.
An alternative to that classification is the one propo-
sed by Coque (2003, 2008), which classifies corporate
governance mechanisms for cooperatives into direct
and indirect mechanisms. The direct mechanisms are
related to information and decision flows including the
participation in the internal organization of the coope-
rative through the election of the positions in the Ge-
neral Assembly and on the other established democra-
tic processes, and control, both ex ante and ex-post, to
prevent managers adversely affects the interests of
members. The indirect mechanisms are related to real
and financial flows; for example to what extent members
would use the services of the cooperative against the
alternative use of those offered by competitors.
To reduce the agency conflicts in Spanish coopera-
tives, it would be interesting to include external direc-
tors in the board (Fama and Jensen, 1983), create a
payment system connected with member objectives
(Jensen, 1994), the separation of the common capital
to encourage the supervision (Jensen and Meckling,
1976), to establish a secondary market in order to
increase the information about the cooperative and 
to facilitate the entrance and leaving of members
(Easterbrook, 1984).
Property rights theory
Previous to the publication of the work of Coase
(1937), the company was considered as a «black box»
in charge of employing inputs (resources) to obtain
outputs (goods and services). From the contribution of
Coase (1937), the company begun to be considered as
a multiplicity of contractual relationships. Based in
this idea, the property right theory arises (Alchian and
Demsetz, 1972).
A property rights system is a method of assigning
to individuals the authority to select the final use of a
specific good among different alternative uses. A pro-
perty right is a protection against the election that other
people could make over an asset that they do not own
(Alchian, 1977; Furubotn and Richter, 2000; O’Driscoll
Jr. and Lee Hoskins, 2006).
This theory focuses on the assignment of property
rights in order to solve problems that may arise because
of incomplete contracts (Klein et al., 1978; Villasalero,
1999). According to many authors (Coase, 1937;
Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart, 1988, 1995; Hart and
Moore, 1990; Milgrom and Roberts, 1993; Brynjolfsson,
1994; Royer, 1999; Sykuta and Chaddad, 1999; among
others), given that transaction costs differ from zero
and contracts are incomplete, property is a key question
in investing and control decisions. In this context,
assets will be reallocated to those uses in which they
yield the highest value. If the contracts were complete,
it would not be important who possesses the asset. A
complete contract would point out what actions should
be carried out due to any contingency that could arise
and what compensation would receive each part. How-
ever, the problem is that the contracts cannot be com-
plete. The contractible decisions are derived of a group
of verifiable operative decisions. The noncontractible
decisions are not materialized in decisions do not
establish a priori and those that consequences are not
known with certainty. These last decisions should be
negotiated among the parts, and in case agreement is
not possible, the decision relapses on the part that
possesses the control rights on the implied assets
(Royer, 1999).
The ownership of an asset implies control over the
residual flows that it generates. Therefore, the owner
of the good is the one that has the incentive to use it
effectively, involving himself or herself in investment
decisions. Following this theory, the owner of the asset
is the one that has to decide what to do with them when
circumstances that were not included ex ante in a con-
tract take place (Tarjizán, 2003). Cook and Iliopoulos
4 For a survey examining the extent to which members of a cooperative can influence managers and members of the board, please
see Spear (2004a,b).
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(1999) argue that in the case where a person does not
have clear possession of an asset, he or she will not
have any incentive to protect its value. In addition, if
property rights cannot be transferred, the probability
that the asset is finally owned by the person who will
use it best is reduced.
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) justify the existence
of the company on the basis of the conflicts that arise
among the members of the team when there is imper-
fect information about the behaviour of team members.
This situation may provoke opportunist behaviour by
individuals, leading to a reduced return to the f irm.
The need for surveillance to avoid opportunist beha-
viour can be solved by giving the residual property
rights to persons who are willing to exercise control
over the team members.
As much in the cooperatives as in the capitalist
f irms, the property right must be exercised by the
owners. Owners are in charge of carrying out the con-
trol right and they perceive the residual rents. However,
important differences exist between both type of firms
(Chaddad and Cook, 2004; Salazar and Galve, 2008).
For example, shareholders of capitalist companies
enjoy the right of control proportional to their partici-
pation on the firm capital. On the contrary, in coope-
rative societies, based on the principle of democratic
governance, each member has only one vote on the
general assembly (O’Connor and Thomson, 2001;
García et al., 2004)5.
As for the residual flows, the shareholders will be-
nefit from earnings derived for their participation in
the capital of the company. However, in cooperatives,
member’s earnings depend on their cooperative activity.
Another important difference between cooperative
and capitalist firms is the transmission of the property
rights. In cooperatives this transmission presents a
series of restrictions. Focusing on Spain, the two possi-
ble transmission forms are «mortis cause» and «inter
vivos» (Salazar and Galve, 2008).
In «mortis cause» transmission, participation passes
the deceased’s heirs. If these were not members, they
should previously acquire member’s condition. For the
«inter vivos» transmission, members will only be able
to transfer their participation to other member or to a
person that not being member becomes member in the
three months following to the transfer. In addition, for
agricultural cooperatives, the new member’s exploitation
should be located in the territorial area that the coope-
rative statute establishes. These limitations on trans-
mission of the property rights also suppose a disadvan-
tage with regard to the other types of firms.
A member leaving the cooperative would receive as
compensation his economic contribution. In case that
the cooperative could not refund money on the legally
established period, members would also receive legal
interests. As a consequence, leaving members would
not benef it by the present and future rents that the
assets may generate. In contrast, in Inc. Corporations,
firm stock prices depend on discounted cash flows.
Some of the problems that are typically associated
to cooperatives are directly connected to the property
rights. Next, we briefly summarize some of them.
The free-rider problem exists because property
rights are untradable, insecure, or unassigned. Royer
(1999, p. 56) refers to it as «a type of common property
problem that emerges when property rights are not
tradable or are not sufficiently well defined and enfor-
ced to ensure that individuals bear the full cost of their
actions or receive the full benefits they create». The
free-rider problem has two origins, internal and external,
and both are often associated with conventional coope-
ratives.
The internal free-rider problem is usually called the
common property problem (Vitaliano, 1983; Nilsson,
2001), and it is cause by the «open doors» policy
(Álvarez et al., 2000; Pérez et al., 2009). In case that
the cooperative accepts new members, these new
members have the same rights as established members.
That is, they will receive the same patronage and resi-
dual rights as existing members although the new
members are not required to make up-front investments
proportionate to their use, causing an intergenerational
conflict in the cooperative (Vitaliano, 1983). This free-
rider will provoke that members encourage decisions
that increase cash flows per member as well as creating
a disincentive to invest because of the dilution of their
returns (underinvestment problem). The external free-
rider problem arises from the fact that property rights
can not be transferred.
The time horizon problem arises because it is not
possible to members to transmit residual rights joint
to the fact that member’s residual claims on the net
income generated by an asset is shorter than the pro-
ductive life of that asset (Vitaliano, 1983; Porter and
Scully, 1987). This will provoke that members have
little incentive to make investments in the long-term
5 However, in some cooperatives, the vote depends on the volume of activity of the member, with a series of limitations.
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driving to underinvestment, which will be more acute
for intangible assets (Ferrier and Porter, 1991; Cook,
1995). Therefore insiders in the cooperative will be
under pressure to: a) increase the amount of cash avai-
lable for payments, and b) try to have investment pro-
jects with a very short pay-back period, even if the
prof itability of those projects is reduced (Dow and
Putterman, 2000; Nilsson, 2001).
Portfolio (risk) problem. According the portfolio
selection theory, specific risk can be reduced or mini-
mized in case of making an efficient diversification.
However, diversif ication is much more complicated
for cooperative members than for capitalist firms due
to the impossible to transmit the residual rights. The
diversification of the portfolios will be conditioned by
the possibility of purchasing or selling the shares. This
limitation leads to sub-optimal decisions for different
reasons (Salazar and Galve, 2008): a) on the one hand,
because it is not possible to satisfy the risk preferences
of all members, so risk sharing is inefficient; b) on the
other hand, members have to accept a risk that could
be avoided by diversification, resulting in a decrease
in their welfare. In addition, as suggested by Ortmann
and King (2007), this problem is exacerbated when
«member’s investment in the cooperative represents a
high proportion of his off-farm investment and to the
extent that his farming risks are positively correlated
with the risks associated to the cooperative».
The problems arising from the vagueness in the
definition of property rights may provoke different
incentives to control agents (Chaddad and Cook, 2004;
Bialoskorski, 2006). Thus, the difficulty of transferring
shares may lead to an increased desire by the coopera-
tive members to control managers. In quoted capitalist
f irms, a stockholder that does not agree on how the
firm is managed can easily sell his stocks. However,
this possibility is much more difficult in cooperatives,
which may drive to cooperative members to get invol-
ved on exerting control. In addition, an open door po-
licy and a greater desire for permanence may incentive
such control. In contrast, the democratic governance
principle, that provides only one vote on the general
assembly to each member, may disincentive exerting
control (Orellana, 2002; Orellana and Rueda, 2004).
Different authors have proposed a series of measures
in order to minimize the previously mentioned pro-
blems. First, to reduce the free-rider conflicts two me-
chanisms could be employed (Vitaliano, 1983; Porter
and Scully, 1987; Staatz, 1987; Condon 1990; Cook and
Iliopoulos, 2000; Henehan and Schmit, 2009): a)
implementing a policy of limiting entry of new members
combined with contracts establishing quality standards
for cooperative products (incomes and outcomes), and
b) establishing a secondary market that would price,
and take an active part in the transmission of, assets
(residual property rights). The creation of such a secon-
dary market, together with structured plans for refun-
ding short term investments (Cook, 1995), are appro-
priate measures to solve the problem of the time
horizon. Finally, the separation of the common capital
and allowing the temporal assignment of the vote to
other member to increase the ownership concentration
or establishing alliances between members would
allow members to eliminate the problem of different
risk aversion levels (Spear, 2004b). In general it is
possible to reduce those problems establishing trust
relationship between members (Balbach and Eccles,
1989; Balbach, 1998; Casadesus-Masanell and Khanna,
2003; James and Sykuta, 2005).
Sample, data and methodology
Sample and data
In Spain there are some 4,000 agricultural coopera-
tives that, in 2007, had a turnover of €17,000 million,
making them a very important part of the economic
activity of the Spanish agricultural sector. A million
members benefit from this economic activity all around
Spain, providing employment for more than 100,000
people. A total of 2,862 of those cooperatives are affi-
liated to Cooperativas Agro-alimentarias, 76 of them
based in Murcia, 2.6% of the total (Cooperativas Agro-
alimentarias, 2009).
In order to locate the cooperatives and their members,
we had the support of the Federación de Cooperativas
Agrícolas de Murcia, FECOAM (Federation of Mur-
cian Agricultural Cooperatives). Due to the popula-
tion’s characteristics (the fact that their members are
in most cases active workers and/or are older) and the
difficulty of obtaining information, personal surveys
were used. To develop the questionnaire we previously
carried out several interviews with key persons (coope-
rative members and directors). This allowed us to have
a broader knowledge of the relationships to be ana-
lysed. Later, in order to develop the final version of
the questionnaire, we made a number of pre-tests.
Geographical dispersion made it difficult to get in
touch with cooperative members, so we profited from
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the celebration of the XIII Day of the Agricultural
Member, organized by FECOAM, which took place in
10 April, 2008 in Torre Pacheco (Murcia). The presen-
ce of about 6,000 members and the procedure employed
to select the sample (simple random sampling) guaran-
tees its representativeness. A total of 334 completed
questionnaires were obtained. Given that some ques-
tionnaires were improperly answered or lacked relevant
information, 57 were removed. Thus, the final sample
was 277 questionnaires.
The questionnaire includes several questions related
to objectives and the members’ level of satisfaction,
agency theory, property rights theory and members’cha-
racteristics. These questions, together with the name
assigned to the variables are presented in the Appendix6.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics. It can be seen
that members attach a high value to each of the objec-
tives, with an average above 6.9/10 in all cases. The
objectives with the higher values are «Not worrying
about marketing», «To assure the sale of the products»,
and «To assure the collection of the products». Not far
behind are «Getting a good sale price», «To assure a
good purchase price», «The availability of services»,
and «The acquisition of useful knowledge for the
development of their activity».
Focusing on the levels of satisfaction, we can also
observe high values of up to 7 for all variables.
In relation to the propensity to invest, we also find
high values in all the proxies that we employ for this
variable. We also observe that members of the coope-
rative do not have strong incentives to exercise control
and that the conduct of the General Assembly is con-
sidered appropriate.
Directors were 11.7% of the respondents. The level
of contribution to the total product of the polled mem-
bers is above average. In terms of the type of partici-
pation they desire, a large majority prefer one member
one vote. This preference is quite surprising given that
most of the members in the final sample make an above
average contribution. The average time in the coopera-
tive is 18 years. Members are inclined to accept new
members (7.2/10), which shows that they are not aware
of the free-rider problem or that they do not feel
threatened by the possibility of new members. In addi-
tion, they believe it would be easy to get their contri-
bution of funds back, even if this type of organisation
imposes important restrictions in comparison with
other type of companies.
Members also think that they do not assume a high
risk when investing in the cooperative. However, they
would like the cooperative to diversify the products
offered in order to reduce risk. Therefore it seems that,
in general, members are highly risk averse. They also
have a slight preference for long term benefit (6.4 on
10). It also should be pointed that many members work
in agricultural activity part time, and that only 54% of
their total revenues come from agricultural activity.
Methodology
First, we examine the influence that several charac-
teristics may have on objectives (Model 1). Then we
examine the effect that those characteristics may have
on the level of satisfaction (Model 2). These characte-
ristics may lead to a discretionary behaviour, provoking
agency conflicts. These models are analysed using
ordinary least squares (OLS). The first model is:
[1]
where OBJECTIVE is a multi-item variable. Two forms
of this variable are used. One of them uses marketing re-
lated variables and the other non-marketing related varia-
bles (see Appendix for more detail). INDVAR includes se-
veral independent variables related to the characteristics
of cooperative members (number of years being member
of the cooperative, whether the member of the coopera-
tive is a director or not, their level of contribution to
the total product of the cooperative, and the percentage
of their income coming from agricultural activity).
Finally, εi represents the term of the estimated error.
In order to measure these objectives and, with the
general consensus in mind that perceptions and atti-
tudes cannot be measured directly (Lastovicka and
Thamodaran, 1991), we use a multi-item classification
scale with categories of ten points, widely adopted by
researchers to assess concepts such as those that concern
us here. In this work, the multi-item variables have
been calculated by adding the value that cooperative
members assigned to the different concepts included
in the multi-item variables.
The second model is:













6 In many cases the name provided to the variable is the same as the question asked on the questionnaire.
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where SATISFACTION refers to a multi-item variable
comprised of different matters associated with the
satisfaction of cooperative members (see Appendix for
details). The other variables are the same as in Model 1.
Next, we examine the effect of some Property Rights
Theory variables (free-rider, risk and time horizon), as
well as some member characteristics, on their tendency
to invest (Model 3) and on their tendency to exercise
control (Model 4). These models are also analysed
employing OLS. The first model is:
[3]
where INVESTMENT refers to a multi-item variable
that measures the propensity to invest (see Appendix)

























To assure the sale of the products 8.447 9.000 2.045
To assure the collection of the products 8.367 9.000 2.096
Get a better sale price 7.777 8.000 2.115
To assure a better purchase price 6.955 8.000 2.979
Availability of services (consultancy, training, etc.) 7.727 8.000 2.261
Acquiring useful knowledge 7.577 8.000 2.302
Not worrying about marketing 8.477 9.000 2.014
Satisfaction
Satisfaction of being cooperative member 8.413 9.000 1.665
Getting a high probability of collecting the products 8.603 9.000 1.667
Getting a satisfactory selling price 7.750 8.000 2.149
Getting a satisfactory purchase price 7.023 8.000 2.833
Getting access to satisfactory technical consultancy 7.760 8.000 2.208
Getting access to other satisfactory services (financing, training, etc.) 7.608 8.000 2.178
Getting access to useful knowledge 7.835 8.000 1.947
Being able to not worry about marketing 8.428 9.000 1.892
Propensity to invest
Disposition to carry out economic efforts 7.515 8.000 2.175
Disposition to sacrifice short term benefit 6.358 7.000 2.895
Disposition to carry out changes in the cooperative 7.950 8.000 2.017
Propensity (o tendency) to exercise control
Propensity (or tendency) to exercise control 3.776 3.000 3.075
Frequency of meetings of the General Assembly 8.178 8.500 2.041
Attendance at the Assembly 7.646 9.000 2.814
Other opinions and characteristics
Numbers of years being member 18.503 17.500 10.975
Director 0.117 0.000 0.322
Percentage of income from agricultural activity 54.250 50.000 36.751
Level of contribution to the total product 0.401 0.000 0.491
Type of participation 0.267 0.000 0.443
Admission of new members 7.279 8.000 2.918
Ease to recover contributions 7.023 8.000 2.684
Investing in the cooperative is highly risky 4.357 4.000 3.041
Product diversification 7.079 8.000 2.827
Permanency desire 8.876 9.000 1.661
Preference for long-term earnings 6.382 7.000 2.609
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participation that the member prefers, number of years
being a member, sensitivity to admitting new members,
ease of recovering contributions). RISK includes
different proxies for the members’ risk aversion (in-
vesting in the cooperative is highly risky, and preference
for the diversification of products). HORIZON refers
to proxies related with member view of the organi-
sation as a long/short term business (preference for the
long term earnings and permanency desire).
The second model is:
[4]
where CONTROL includes the members’ propensity to
exercise control measured by a multi-item variable (see
Appendix). The other variables are the same as inclu-
ded in Model 3.
Results
Results of Models (1) to (4) are shown in Tables 2
to 5. Tables 2 and 3 present the effect of some member
characteristics on the objectives and on the level of sa-
tisfaction, respectively. In Tables 4 and 5 the results for
the influence of Property Rights Theory variables on the
tendency to invest and to exercise control are presented.
We observe in Table 2 (Panels A and B) that direc-
tors place a higher value on the objectives analysed,
and that this difference is statistically significant. This
result could imply larger implication on exerting con-
trol by members of the Board. In addition, direc-
tors are more informed about the cooperative and thus
they consider that these objectives of the coopera-
tive will help them to reach their personal objectives.
We also find that members with a high percentage of
their income coming from agricultural activity value
the proposed objectives more. This result is also lo-
gical, given that their incomes are less diversif ied 
and they are more dependent on the cooperative objec-
tives.
However, there are no apparent differences when we
compare members according to their contribution to
the total product or the number of years they have been
members of the cooperative.
Table 3 provides a similar analysis employing the
members’ satisfaction as the dependent variable. The
results show that directors are more satisfied. We also
f ind that members with a large percentage of their
income coming from agricultural activity are overall
more satisfied, and this result is statistically significant
at the 1% level. The fact of assuring the sale of the pro-
duct and getting a good sale price can be determinant

























Panel A: Effect of member’s characterstics on marketing related objectives
Constant 31.743 1.173***
Numbers of years being member –0.047 0.038
Director 3.345 1.258***
Percentage of income from agricultural activity 0.029 0.012**
Level of contribution to the total product 0.701 0.909
Adjusted R2 0.041
F 3.590***
Panel B: Effect of members’ characteristics on non-marketing related the objectives 
Constant 20.096 1.088***
Numbers of years being member –0.039 0.036
Director 2.739 1.169**
Percentage of income from agricultural activity 0.039 0.011***
Level of contribution to the total product 1.143 0.844
Adjusted R2 0.058
F 4.767***
Note: *** and ** denote statistical signification at a 1% and 5%, respectively.
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In terms of contribution to the final product and the
number of years being a member of the cooperative,
we do not find that they have any statistically signifi-
cant influence on the level of satisfaction.
Therefore, we can conclude that directors place a
higher value on the objectives of the cooperative and
are more satisfied with the cooperative. This may indi-
cate that they identify more closely with the coopera-
tive because of their direct involvement. However,
there are no corresponding differences when we consi-
der members’ contribution to the final product and the
number of years being member of the cooperative. This
may be because these differences do not necessarily
imply more or less involvement with the cooperative.
Overall, all members value the objectives and are
satisfied, but directors and members with higher per-
centage of their income coming from agricultural
activity are more positive on both dimensions.
In Table 4 we present results on the effect of Property
Rights Theory variables on members’ propensity to
invest. In relation to the free-rider problem, we observe
statistical differences on investing patterns between
members that prefer different participation types in the
General Assembly. Therefore, a preference for having
a number of votes that depends on the contribution to
the cooperative’s final product can be considered an
incentive to invest. This may be due to the fact that voting
power based on the product contribution is a safeguard
mechanism. Time in the cooperative does influence the
propensity to invest. However, we find a statistically
positive relationship between the preference to admit
new members and the member’s willingness to invest.
Thus, it seems that members are not aware of the free-
rider problem produced by admitting new members or
by other mechanisms, for example new contribution
of funds. Finally, following Property Rights Theory,
we find that members who think it is easier to recover
their contributions are more likely to invest.
In terms of risk, we find that members’ propensity
to invest does not depend on their opinion about the
riskiness of investing in the cooperative. As it was
commented previously, the members of the cooperative
in the sample analysed think that investment in the
cooperative does not imply excessive risk and therefore
it does not influence their decision about investing or
not investing. However, we observe a significant and
positive relationship between members wanting more
diversification and the readiness to invest. Diversifi-
cation, as a safeguard mechanism for the members of
the cooperative, reducing their risk, seems to influence
their tendency to invest.
In terms of the investment time horizon, we do not
observe that those members that prefer short term
investments have a larger propensity to invest. As pre-
viously indicated, members may not be aware of the
free rider problem of accepting new members who will
benefit from previous investment, and thus they do not
prefer short-term earnings. However, we observe a
positive relationship between the permanency desire
Table 3. Ordinary least squares regressions on the influen-





Numbers of years being member –0.039 0.071
Director 5.546 2.335**
Percentage of income from agricultural 
activity 0.069 0.023***




Note: *** and ** denote statistical signification at a 1% and
5%, respectively.
Table 4. Ordinary least squares regressions on the influence







Type of participation 1.572 0.742*
Number of years being member 0.012 0.031
Admission of new members 0.433 0.118***
Ease to recover contributions 0.249 0.127*
Risk
Investing in the cooperative is highly 
risky –0.095 0.113
Product diversification 0.204 0.122*
Time horizon
Preference for short-term earnings –0.074 0.126
Permanency desire 0.843 0.201***
Adjusted R2 0.187
F 7.992***
Note: **, ** and * denote statistical signification at a 1%, 5%
and 10%, respectively.
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and the propensity to invest. The wish to remain in the
cooperative for a long time is a safeguard mechanism
for the members of the cooperative. This wish to re-
main could also be a partial explanation why they do
not prefer short-term investments.
Table 5 shows the results on the relationship between
Property Rights Theory variables and the propensity
to exercise control. We observe that two free-rider asso-
ciated variables give support to Property Rights Theory.
Those members who have spent more time in the coo-
perative and agree with the admission of new members
are more inclined to exercise control. This may be
because established members are aware of the possible
advantages that new members can derive from previous
investments, and they wish to exercise control over the
resources, and because they feel it necessary to take
decisions to safeguard their interests and avoid free
rider problems associated to the opportunism of new
members.
On the other hand, we f ind that the result for the
participation type variable is not statistically significant.
Finally, in relation to the free-rider problem, those
members who think that it is easier to recover their initial
contribution are highly motivated to exercise control.
This result is the opposite of the one suggested by
Property Rights Theory. One would expect that where
is easy to leave the cooperative without incurring eco-
nomic losses, members would not make any effort in
supervision and would simply finish their relationship
with the cooperative if they were not satisfied. A possi-
ble explanation is that members who think it is easy to
leave are motivated to exercise control and to manage
the cooperative well, to prevent the departure of other
members, which might threaten the effectiveness, or
even the survival, of the cooperative.
Focusing on risk, we find that members who think
that investing in the cooperative is highly risky are
more motivated to exercise control. This is logical and
gives support to Property Rights Theory. However, we
do not find a significant relationship between members
who want diversification and the propensity to exercise
control.
In terms of the time horizon (preference for short-
term earnings and permanency desire), we observe that
those members who prefer long term earnings have a
larger propensity to control. This is logical if we think
that the long term investments give the agent more
discretion and, therefore, increase the need for super-
vision. At the same time, we f ind that permanence
desire has a positive and significant effect on control.
Those members that want to remain longer as coopera-
tive members want to have more control over the admi-
nistration. This greater control would help them to
achieve the objectives that compensate their efforts.
In sum, we observe some influence of property rights
theory variables on exercising control in the cooperative,
mainly when focusing on the time horizon of investments
and on some free-rider and risk related variables.
Table 6 present additional analysis to test whether
there exist differences between directors and non-di-
rectors relative to their propensity to invest and their
propensity to exert control, as well as for free rider,
risk and horizon variables.
Results show, on the one hand, that directors are
more motivated to invest in the cooperative. On the
other hand, results also show that directors are more
motivated to exert control. Given that the fact of being
director provides them more influence on the decision-
making process, both results can be considered logical.
In addition, in most cases, variables determining the
propensity to invest and to exert control of members
of the cooperative (shown in Tables 4 and 5) also exert
influence on the propensity to invest and to exert control
of directors; giving robustness to the results obtained
previously.
Table 5. Ordinary least squares regressions on the influence







Type of participation 0.556 0.837
Number of years being member 0.085 0.036**
Admission of new members 0.223 0.113*
Ease to recover contributions 0.531 0.143***
Risk
Investing in the cooperative is highly 
risky 0.229 0.128*
Product diversification 0.066 0.137
Time horizon
Preference for short-term earnings –0.392 0.0142***
Permanency desire 0.661 0.227**
Adjusted R2 0.139
F 5.867***
Note: **, ** and * denote statistical signification at a 1%, 5%
and 10%, respectively.
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Discussion
The large power that the cooperative managers have,
combined with the fact that property rights are not
properly defined, mean that agency theory and proper-
ty rights theory provide a good framework for the study
of the member-cooperative relationship. Based on
agency theory we first examined possible conflict of
objectives between members and managers, and the
possibility of different level of satisfaction. Next, we
tested the influence of some property rights theory
variables (free rider, risk and time horizon) on members’
propensity to invest and to exercise control.
The sample examined includes 277 personal surveys
to members of agricultural cooperatives based in the
region of Murcia. The results show that all members
value all the proposed objectives and they are highly
satisfied with being cooperative members. We also find
that members belonging to the board and members
with a higher percentage of their income depending on
agricultural activity attach higher values to both objec-
tives and level of satisfaction. These results may be
due to the fact that directors and members with higher
percentage of their income depending on agricultural
activity have more involvement in the cooperative and
have more influence in day-to-day decision making,
identifying themselves more with the cooperative and
valuing its advantages.
In relation to property rights, the variables related
with the problem of the free rider (apart for the wish
to stay in the cooperative) have a positive influence on
the propensity to invest. Members who prefer that the
vote in the general assembly is proportional to the
quantity of product they contribute are willing to invest
more, because this voting pattern would protect the
investments that they make. Those members that prefer
the admission of new members are more inclined to
invest, because they do not appreciate that the free-
rider is a problem. This may be due to the fact that some
mechanism exists to minimize this problem. For
example, there may be a requirement for the new mem-
ber to contribute additional entrance quotas to the
social capital. Finally, the members who think that it
is easier to leave the cooperative without incurring
losses are more interested in investing. Probably they
consider that they will not have problems recovering
their contributions. In relation to risk, the members
who want to diversify investments are willing to invest
more to achieve this objective. Finally, member who
want to be in the cooperative for more time want to
invest more.
Focusing on the effect that property rights theory
variables have on the propensity to exercise control,
we observe some evidence of the presence of a free-
rider problem when exercising control, shown by the
variables related to the members’ time of membership
Table 6. Differences between directors and non-directors for propensity to invest, to exert con-
trol and for the variables relatives to free rider, risk and horizon problems
Director minus Statistical
non-directors significance
Propensity to invest (+) –6.680***
Propensity to exercise control (+) –5.562***
Free rider
Type of participation (+) –1.120
Number of years being member (+) –1.449
Admission of new members (+) –2.447**
Ease to recover contributions (+) –2.687***
Risk
Investing in the cooperative is highly risky (+) –0.279
Product diversification (+) –2.463**
Time horizon
Preference for short-term earnings (–) –2.220**
Permanency desire (+) –2.963***
Note: *** and ** denote statistical signification at a 1% and 5%, respectively.
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and the admission of new members. However, the type
of participation that the member prefers and the ease
of recovering initial investments present no significant
effect and the opposite sign to that predicted by pro-
perty rights theory, respectively. We also f ind that
members who think that investing in the cooperative
is highly risky are more motivated to exercise control.
We also f ind evidence of the problem of the time
horizon in relation to the propensity to exercise control.
Members who want longer term benefits and intend to
remain in the cooperative longer are more inclined to
supervise. Therefore, we find certain evidence of the
free-rider and risk problems and a clear effect of the
time horizon. Besides, directors have a larger tendency
to invest and to exert control that non-directors.
To avoid the agency and property right problems in
the cooperatives, Fama and Jensen (1983), Vitaliano
(1983), Easterbrook (1984), Staatz (1987), Spear (2004b),
and Salazar and Galve (2008), among others, make se-
veral proposals. For example, it would be interesting
to limit the entry of new members, separate the common
capital, to impose quality standards, and create a se-
condary market. These measures involve the introduc-
tion of the so-called «new generation cooperatives»,
which are mainly proliferating in USA. It would also
be interesting incorporating external directors to the
Board, introducing payment systems that connects the
principals’ utility function to members’ objectives and
ensuring members have information and participle
actively in the management of the cooperative in order
to improve their satisfaction levels.
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Appendix. Variables used in this study
Variable Question in the questionnaire
Objectives
Marketing related objectives
To assure the sale of the products
To assure the collection of the products
To get a better sale price
To assure a better purchase price
Non-marketing related objectives
Availability of services (consultancy, formation...)
Acquiring useful knowledge
Not worrying on marketing
Satisfaction
Satisfaction of being cooperative member 
To assure the collection of the products
Indicate whether the following reasons influenced your decision to join
the cooperative (0 = Not at all. 10 = Yes, very much)
To assure the sale of the products
To assure the collection of the products
To get a better sale price
To assure a better purchase price
Availability of services (consultancy, formation...)
To acquire useful knowledge for the development of this activity
Easiness of the commercialization in order to focus on production 
Indicate the extent of your agreement with the following statements
(0 = total disagreement. 10 = total agreement) 
Level of satisfaction with the overall relationship with the cooperative
To assure the collection of the products 
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Appendix (cont.). Variables used in this study
Variable Question in the questionnaire
Getting a good sale price 
Getting a good purchase price
Availability of technical services 
Availability of services (consultancy, training, etc.)
Acquiring useful knowledge
Not worrying about marketing
Propensity to invest
Disposition to carry out economic efforts
Disposition to sacrifice the short term benefit
Disposition to carry out changes in the coope-
rative
Propensity to exercise control 
Time spent on exercising control
Frequency of meetings of the General Assembly
Attendance at the Assembly
Other opinions and characteristics 
Numbers of years being member
Director
% Incomes from agricultural activity 
Level of contribution to the total product
Type of participation
Admission of new members
Easiness to recover contributions
Investing in the cooperative is highly risky
Product diversification
Permanency desire
Preference for short-term earnings
Getting a good sale price 
Getting a good purchase price
Availability of technical services
Availability of services (consultancy, training, etc.)
To acquire useful knowledge for the development of this activity
Ease of the commercialization in order to focus on production 
Indicate the extent of your agreement with the following statements
(0 = total disagreement. 10 = total agreement) 
You are willing to carry out economic efforts for the appropriate running
of the cooperative. 
You are willing to sacrifice your own immediate benefit in order to get a
better position for the cooperative in the long run
You are willing to carry out the necessary changes in order that the coo-
perative can adapt to the market
Indicate the extent of your agreement with the following statements
(0 = total disagreement. 10 = total agreement) 
Does it take you much time to exercise control? 
You think the General Assembly meets at the right intervals
You attend to all the meetings of the General Assembly
How long (in years) have you been you member of the cooperative? 
Are you member of the board of directors right now (0 = no. 1 = yes)
From your total revenues, what percentage comes from agricultural activity? 
Comparing product with the other members of your cooperative, you are:
0 = among the members that contribute more; 1 = among those that con-
tribute less
What type of participation do you prefer for the General Assembly?
0 = only one vote per member. 1 = a number of votes according to the pro-
duct contribution. 
Indicate the extent of your agreement with the following statement (0 = to-
tal disagreement. 10 = total agreement): I would like that new members
join the cooperative
Indicate the extent of your agreement with the following statement (0 = to-
tal disagreement. 10 = total agreement): If I were interested, it would be
easy to get the money I invested back. 
Indicate the extent of your agreement with the following statement (0 = to-
tal disagreement. 10 = total agreement): Investing in the cooperative is
highly risky
Indicate the extent of your agreement with the following statement (0 = to-
tal disagreement. 10 = total agreement): I would like the cooperative to
diversify its products in order to diminish its risk 
I wish to continue being member of the cooperative (0 = total disagree-
ment. 10 = total agreement)
Indicate the extent of your agreement with the following statement (0 = to-
tal disagreement. 10 = total agreement): I prefer short-term earnings. 
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